Was The Munich Agreement A Success Or Failure

December 20, 2020 – 9:17 am

Czechoslovakia was informed by Great Britain and France that it could either oppose Nazi Germany or submit to the prescribed annexes. The Czechoslovakian government single-purposely acknowledged the desperation of the fight against the Nazis, reluctantly capitulated (30 September) and agreed to abide by the agreement. The colony gave Germany, from 10 October, the Sudetenland and de facto control of the rest of Czechoslovakia as long as Hitler promised not to go any further. On 30 September, after some time off, Chamberlain went to Hitler`s house and asked him to sign a peace treaty between the United Kingdom and Germany. After Hitler`s interpreter translated it for him, he was glad to have accepted it. In the United States and the United Kingdom, the words “Munich” and “appeasement” are synonymous with a call for frank, often military measures to resolve an international crisis and to characterize a political adversary that condemns the negotiations as a weakness. In 1950, U.S. President Harry Truman invoked “Munich” to justify his military action in the Korean War: “The world has learned from Munich that security cannot be bought by appeasement.” [103] Many subsequent crises were accompanied by “Munchner” cries from politicians and the media. In 1960, conservative U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater used “Munich” to describe a domestic policy issue, saying that an attempt by the Republican Party to challenge liberals was “the Munich of the Republican Party.” [104] In 1962, General Curtis LeMay told U.S. President John F. Kennedy that his refusal to bomb Cuba during the Cuban crisis was “almost as serious as the appeasement in Munich.” [105] In 1965, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, justifying enhanced military action in Vietnam, said, “Hitler and Munich taught us that success only fuels the appetite for aggression.” [106] Stephen R.

Rock describes his methodology in the appeasement in International Politics as a “structured and concentrated comparison”. (Rock 2000, 16) With this technique, the researcher conducts a detailed study of a small number of cases, asks the same questions and identifies essential similarities and differences. This paper uses the same techniques, although there are still fewer cases studied here than in Rock`s research. However, the objective is the same; Why did Chamberlain decide to appease Hitler in 1938 and is there an applicability of the failure of this appeasement to the fall of Iran`s nuclear programme today? Dr. Rock notes that “comparative methods are often unable to provide conclusive empirical examination of theoretical sentences” (ibid.) and that this conclusion is even more applicable with this very limited research. This document will not claim to be decisive in terms of theoretical generalizations, but only to examine the unique characteristics of a particular case and, at best, to be “highly enlightened and highly persuasive”. (ibid., 17) The agreement was widely welcomed. French Prime Minister Daladier did not believe, as one scholar put it, that a European war was justified “to keep three million Germans under Czech sovereignty.” But the same is true for Alsace-Lorraine, unlike the alliance between France and Czechoslovakia against German aggression. Gallup Polls, in Britain, France and the United States, said the majority of the population supported the agreement.

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